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WHEN BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO GOOD 
SOVEREIGN DEBT CONTRACTS: 
THE CASE OF ECUADOR 
 
ARTURO C. PORZECANSKI* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Multinational corporations were meant to be reassured by the protections 
incorporated into bilateral and regional investment agreements. However, judging 
from the growing number of claims filed with the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and other arbitration vehicles—more than three 
hundred and fifty treaty-based, investor–state disputes as of the end of 2009—it is 
evident that many corporations have found out the hard way that sovereign states are 
not always suitably restrained by the international treaties they have signed and 
ratified.
1
 
Likewise, private-sector commercial-bank creditors, bondholders, and 
suppliers—even official bilateral and multilateral lenders—have come to learn by 
repeat experience that financial contracts entered into by sovereign borrowers, no 
matter how airtight and well-intentioned at the time they were crafted and signed, can 
be perverted or ignored by governments lacking in ability or willingness to pay. 
This article illustrates this point by focusing on the case of Ecuador, a country 
whose governments have defaulted nine times on foreign-currency bonds and 
numerous times to foreign commercial-bank creditors and others, such that the 
sovereign has been in default for at least 109 out of the last 184 years—sixty percent 
of the time from 1826 through 2010.
2
 By its own reckoning, the government has 
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been in arrears on interest payments to some foreign creditor or another in each and 
every year starting in 1987.
3
 
The lesson from abundant history is that, despite decades of innovations in 
international-loan and bond contracts involving sovereign financial 
obligations—courtesy of some of the best minds in New York, London, and 
beyond—lawyers, bankers, analysts, and investors are best advised to operate under 
no illusions: sovereigns are indeed sovereign, independent of the laws of other 
nations. Those who harbored the hope that Argentina’s bad behavior as a sovereign 
debtor was a major exception that would not soon be repeated should be persuaded 
by the case of Ecuador that, although the absence of sovereign willingness to pay 
remains rare, it is not rare enough. Notwithstanding the best of legal contracts and the 
surrender of sovereign immunities under New York, English, or other foreign law, in 
actual practice, rogue sovereign debtors can be held accountable or effectively 
restrained only by the forceful actions of other sovereigns.
4
 During the nineteenth 
century, this was sometimes accomplished by the successful exercise of military 
force and, during the twentieth century, through the application of diplomatic, trade, 
and financial sanctions or incentives, both unilaterally and through multilateral 
organizations. 
 
II 
THE GOOD INTENTIONS 
 
After repeated refinancings and deferrals of debt-service obligations to foreign 
commercial banks, and the accumulation of sizeable interest arrears (particularly 
from 1987 through 1994), the government of Ecuador finally reached a 
comprehensive debt-forgiveness and restructuring deal in 1995, under the aegis of 
the Brady Plan. The terms agreed to reflected creditor concessions that were more 
generous than those granted to any other Latin American government up to that 
moment; in particular, the discount bond—accepted by creditors willing to give up 
claims on principal owed—involved a forty-five percent ―haircut‖ rather than the 
usual thirty-five percent.
5
 As in other Brady Plan applications, the various securities 
issued in exchange for old defaulted loans (in this instance the par, discount, 
past-due-interest, and interest-equalization bonds) incorporated a number of legal 
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innovations designed to make them virtually inviolable in any future economic 
emergency. First, they were freely transferrable bonds listed on the Luxembourg 
Stock Exchange, precisely so their ownership could change over time and so they 
would not be easily traceable for the purpose of getting them restructured again. 
Second, the bonds that involved debt forgiveness or concessional interest rates and 
that had very long grace periods and maturities (the pars and discounts) were backed 
in part with good collateral (U.S. government zero-coupon bonds), so future 
governments would not be tempted to default merely to avoid servicing them. And, 
third, the new bonds contained ―exit covenants‖ by which the obligor pledged neither 
to ask for a future restructuring of the securities nor to request additional funding 
from the holders of the bonds.
6
 
In addition, the Ecuador and other loan-for-Brady-bond exchanges were 
accompanied by concrete steps and pledges of improved macroeconomic policies 
and market-friendly structural reforms that would enhance the ability of governments 
and their successors to service the new financial obligations until their eventual 
maturity. In Ecuador’s case, good progress in terms of economic stabilization and 
structural reforms was made ahead of the Brady Plan’s implementation, with the 
support of the Washington-based multilateral agencies, moving the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) twice (in 1992 and 1994) to endorse a rescheduling of debts 
owed by the government of Ecuador to the official foreign-aid and export-financing 
agencies represented at the Paris Club. However, in 1995, the debt relief obtained in 
these reschedulings was squandered via increased military spending following a brief 
border war with Peru; and what had been a duly balanced government budget from 
1993 through 1994 became a string of deepening fiscal deficits—and renewed 
foreign indebtedness, including for armaments. Battered also by drought-related 
power shortages and the adverse repercussions of the financial crisis in Mexico, the 
economy stagnated that year, and the country’s vice president, who had been the 
driver of market-friendly economic reforms, fled Ecuador to evade arrest on charges 
of corruption.
7
 
Notwithstanding the good intentions incorporated into the 1995 debt-relief 
operation, by 1999, Ecuador was in very serious—indeed far more 
serious—financial trouble. A decline in world oil prices, damaging floods 
occasioned by the El Niño weather phenomenon, a drop in capital inflows in the 
wake of the Asian and Russian financial woes, a major domestic banking crisis, and 
loose fiscal and monetary policies all combined to push the economy to the brink of 
ruin. During the second half of that year, Ecuador became the world’s first 
government to default on its Brady bonds. Ecuador defaulted as well on two 
Eurobonds that had been issued in better days (1997) and on dollar-denominated 
domestic obligations maturing in the short run. In a desperate move, the government 
officially dollarized the economy in January 2000, but soon after, the president was 
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deposed and was replaced by his vice president. As financial stability and improved 
macroeconomic policies took hold, the IMF offered its financial support in April of 
that year—provided that substantial debt relief was obtained from foreign private 
creditors.
8
 
In July of 2000, with the IMF’s backing, the government sought and obtained a 
second round of principal forgiveness from its creditors, estimated at around forty 
percent of face value. Bondholders were presented with a take-it-or-leave-it 
exchange offer whereby they would get new, uncollateralized obligations due in 
2030 that paid very little interest, at least in the initial years, in exchange for their 
long-dated Brady bonds, to which a heavy discount was applied, and for their 
short-dated Eurobonds, to which no discount was applied. If creditors had opted 
instead for a bond paying a high interest rate and maturing in 2012, they would have 
had to concede an additional thirty-five percent ―haircut‖ on the principal owed by 
Ecuador. Some ninety-seven percent of all bondholders accepted the exchange offer, 
which gave Ecuador substantial debt reduction as well as significant cash-flow relief 
in the initial years.
9
 
The new bonds incorporated contractual innovations meant to reassure investors 
that the risk of future losses would be minimized and that the new securities had 
upside potential. As the venerable Lee Buchheit, New York counsel to the Republic 
of Ecuador, recounted, ―A deliberate effort was . . . made to include structural 
features in the new bonds that would reduce the likelihood that the debt stock would 
become the subject of a third round of debt relief in the future.‖10 The first legal 
innovation was to incorporate a pledge that, if there should be a default that was not 
cured within one year on the 2030 bonds during the first decade after issuance, 
Ecuador would compensate bondholders: it would grant them additional 2030 bonds 
under a sliding scale, starting with an extra thirty percent of bonds if the default took 
place in the first four years after their original issuance. This principal-reinstatement 
provision sought not only to reassure those investors who had granted debt 
forgiveness that a meaningful portion of their original claims against Ecuador would 
be restored in case of a default, but also to discourage future Ecuadorian 
governments from defaulting by making it expensive for them to do so. 
The second legal novelty was to include a binding commitment that Ecuador 
would repurchase a specified percentage of both the outstanding 2012 and 2030 
bonds in each year starting six and eleven years after their issuance, respectively. 
These mandatory buybacks (at secondary-market prices) were intended to set 
investors’ minds at rest that the aggregate amount of Ecuador’s bonded debt would 
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be gradually reduced to a smaller, more manageable size before the bonds matured 
and to reassure them that, by its actions, the government of Ecuador would help 
bolster the price of these securities in the secondary market. Ecuador’s failure to 
meet the debt-reduction targets in any one year would trigger a mandatory partial 
redemption of the bonds at par. However, this novelty was potentially quite 
advantageous also for Ecuador because it allowed the government to satisfy its 
amortization commitments by purchasing the bonds and retiring them whenever they 
traded at a discount in the secondary market—which they usually did, at prices in the 
range of fifty to sixty cents on the dollar. If the 2012 or 2030 bonds were ever to trade 
above par, the government could always make the amortization payments at par.
11
 
With the IMF’s blessing, the Paris Club subsequently refinanced accumulated 
arrears and maturities through April 2001. It did not grant any debt forgiveness, 
however, just as it had not done in the early 1990s. And yet Ecuador’s interest and 
principal arrears to official creditors were more than twice as large as they had been 
to commercial banks and bondholders before the refinancing.
12
 Evidently, while 
Ecuador was deemed (by the United States and European governments, as well as by 
the IMF’s management) to be insolvent enough to deserve major write-offs from 
private creditors twice in five years, it was considered solvent enough not to deserve 
write-offs from official creditors even once—despite being in the midst of the 
country’s arguably worst economic crisis. This was one of several instances in which 
the Paris Club’s principle of ―comparable treatment‖ proved to be a highly 
discretionary one-way street.
13
 It would take less than a decade for investors in 
vintage-2000 Ecuador bonds to come to regret ever owning the new, and supposedly 
much-improved, securities. 
 
III 
THE BAD OUTCOMES 
 
In late 2008 the current populist government of Ecuador, headed by President 
Rafael Correa, defaulted on the 2012 and 2030 sovereign bonds, claiming they were 
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immoral and illegitimate obligations.
14
 At no point before or after the default—when 
Ecuador was repurchasing the bonds both indirectly (through the secondary market) 
and directly (through a buyback for thirty-five cents on the dollar)—did the 
government assert that servicing these obligations posed a financial hardship. There 
was no objective basis for doing so: in 2008, the public external debt was the least 
burdensome it had been in over three decades, relative to government revenues or to 
the gross domestic product (GDP). Moreover, the country’s central bank held more 
freely disposable international reserves ($6.5 billion) than it had ever accumulated 
before.
15
 The United States and Europe were in a financial crisis and world oil prices 
had plunged, but the Ecuadorian economy was unusually well positioned to 
withstand these exogenous shocks, which proved temporary anyway. Therefore, this 
default was not the consequence of a sovereign’s inability to pay.16 It was also out of 
character with Ecuador’s many prior defaults, which had taken place during major 
fiscal and economic emergencies. 
During the period from 2000 through 2005, the government’s external public 
indebtedness remained fairly steady averaging $11.25 billion, then declined to $10.1 
billion by the time of the default, as repayments exceeded new disbursements 
because rising world oil prices provided a fiscal windfall that minimized Ecuador’s 
borrowing needs. The economy expanded steadily and the market value of Ecuador’s 
GDP ballooned from an abnormally depressed $16 billion in 2000 to $54 billion by 
2008. Consequently, by the time President Correa announced the default, the ratio of 
external public debt to GDP had dropped sharply from seventy percent in 2000 to a 
very manageable proportion of under twenty percent in 2008 (see Figure 1 below). 
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Figure 1: Ecuador’s External Public Debt as a Percentage of GDP (including 
any interest or principal arrears)
17
 
 
 
Servicing this external indebtedness imposed an increasingly lighter burden on 
the country and its public finances, especially given the rapid growth of government 
revenues during the intervening years, from $4.2 billion in 2000 to $21.4 billion in 
2008. The interest bill averaged $1 billion in 2000 and 2001, but it started to drop and 
settled at less than $700 million per annum in 2002 through 2008. As a proportion of 
government revenues, interest payments dropped from over twenty-six percent in 
2000 to under four percent in 2008, and in relation to GDP, they fell from seven 
percent to nearly one percent (see Figure 2 below). 
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Figure 2: Interest Payments on Ecuador’s External Public Debt (including any 
interest arrears)
18
 
 
 
In particular, the 2012 and 2030 bonds, which accounted for nearly one-third of 
the external public debt as of the end of 2008, required annual interest payments of 
$331 million, which is the equivalent of a mere 1.9% of 2008 government revenues 
and 0.6% of 2008 GDP—a relatively insignificant amount by any standard. Even 
though revenues and GDP dropped somewhat in 2009 in the aftermath of the global 
recession, the burden of interest payments on the 2012 and 2030 bonds would not 
have increased appreciably in the absence of a default. 
To understand the genesis of this decision to default out of unwillingness rather 
than inability to pay, it is necessary to paint a brief profile of President Correa. He 
was born in 1963 in the coastal city of Guayaquil to a family of modest means. 
Throughout his formative years—until age twenty-eight, in fact—he attended or was 
otherwise affiliated with Catholic schools and universities, mostly run by the 
Salesians, one of the world’s largest Catholic missionary orders. This upbringing 
included spending one year on a mission at a social center run by the Salesians in the 
Cotopaxi province, where Correa gained empathy for the native population, by 
seeing their extreme poverty up close. In a speech delivered recently at Oxford 
entitled My Experience as a Leftist Christian in a Secular World, President Correa 
stated that his ―economic principles are based on the Social Doctrine of the Catholic 
Church and on Liberation Theology.‖19 He denounced the very unequal distribution 
of income in Latin America and said, ―As a practicing Catholic, I will always believe 
in the importance of charity and solidarity,‖ and he pledged to keep ruling ―with a 
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clear preferential option for [helping] the poorest and the forgotten; and [for] 
prioritizing human beings over [the owners of] capital.‖20 
Vice President Alfredo Palacio, a cardiologist with no business experience, 
―discovered‖ Correa in 2003, when Correa was an economics professor and 
consultant. Palacio retained Correa as his economic advisor on the issue of how to set 
up and pay for a universal health-care system, which had been one of Palacio’s 
campaign promises.
21
 At the time, funding for social programs was limited, and 
resources that might otherwise be available were not within reach because a portion 
of oil-related revenues was being deposited into a government fund known as the 
Stabilization and Investment Fund for Petroleum Resources (FEIREP).
22
 The fund 
was set up in 2002 largely to generate the fiscal savings necessary to pay for the 
buybacks required by the debt restructuring of 2000. Palacio and Correa tried to tap 
into the FEIREP to help fund a universal health-care system, but were unsuccessful. 
In March 2005, Correa presented a foreboding paper at a meeting sponsored by a 
regional council of Christian churches held to discuss Latin America’s foreign-debt 
problems. It was entitled Debt Exchange: It’s All About the Creditors, and in it, 
Correa denounced the 2000 restructuring as having delivered insufficient relief. To 
begin with, he wrote, Ecuador’s obligations should have been written down to 
then-prevailing prices in the secondary market—precisely the kind of massive 
forgiveness that Argentina was rightly demanding, he felt, from its creditors. Correa 
went on to denounce the FEIREP for starving the country of funds for social 
programs and for enriching bondholders by boosting the market price of Ecuador’s 
debt.
23
 
A few weeks later, on April 20, 2005, Palacio was appointed to the presidency 
when the legislature removed the incumbent, Lucio Gutiérrez. This followed a week 
of growing popular unrest and was done as political retribution against what was 
perceived as dictatorial decisions made by President Gutiérrez in prior months.
24
 
Palacio, in turn, appointed Rafael Correa as his finance minister. Correa wasted no 
time in proposing to the legislature the abolition of the FEIREP, which it did in June 
while setting up an alternate fund (CEREPS), largely to underwrite social spending.
25
 
This was done even though the FEIREP, which had accumulated $1.1 billion during 
its nineteen months of existence, had not spent a single dollar to buy back any foreign 
debt. According to the World Bank, the fund had been turned into ―the piggy bank to 
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finance the liquidity needs of the central government.‖26 Correa also denounced the 
prior administration’s supposedly secret consent to various policy conditions 
imposed by the IMF and the World Bank, threatened to withhold debt-service 
payments to the multilateral agencies if they did not fulfill their loan commitments, 
and raised the possibility of bypassing the multilateral agencies altogether and selling 
bonds to Venezuela instead.
27
 
In late July, the World Bank made it known to Minister Correa that it would not 
authorize the disbursement of a $100-million loan he was counting on. Correa fired 
off an angry letter to World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz, telling him the Bank had 
offended Ecuador by reneging on the loan and demanding to know precisely why the 
disbursement had been cancelled.
28
 A couple of days later, having set himself 
proverbially ablaze, Minister Correa tendered his resignation at the request of 
President Palacio, whose office let it be known that the minister had failed to keep his 
superior properly informed of his (inflammatory) activities.
29
 During his 106 days in 
office, Correa had managed to ruin the government’s access to external funding, but 
by wrapping himself in the national flag to confront the Washington multilateral 
agencies, supposedly on behalf of the dispossessed of Ecuador, he had also 
succeeded in gaining national name recognition—thereby setting the stage for his 
candidacy in the next presidential election. Upon departure, Correa’s popular 
approval rating was fifty-seven percent, the highest among cabinet members and 
nearly twenty percentage points higher than President Palacio’s own.30 
Rafael Correa would go on to win the presidential election held in November 
2006, and his inaugural address on January 15, 2007, presaged his get-tough attitude 
toward foreign bondholders. He stated that one of the main challenges facing 
Ecuador was to overcome a culture of issuing debt abroad, which had left the country 
saddled with ―a very costly overindebtedness‖—a gross factual misrepresentation. 
He said a country’s debt service should be subject to a sustainability criterion; for 
example, debt-service burdens should not be incompatible with the achievement of 
the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals. He also stated that part of 
Ecuador’s foreign debt was illegitimate, had been acquired under dubious 
circumstances, was not used for its intended purposes, and had been ―repaid several 
times‖ already.31 Ideally, President Correa acknowledged, governments should be 
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able to appeal to an impartial and transparent international tribunal that would 
determine which obligations should be serviced and a country’s objective capacity to 
pay. He noted, however, that such an impartial third-party forum does not exist; there 
is only the IMF, ―the creditors’ representative.‖32 This is why, Correa concluded, his 
administration would engage in a ―firm and sovereign renegotiation of the external 
debt, above all of the inadmissible conditions that were imposed on us in the debt 
exchange of 2000.‖33 
Nearly six months later, on July 9, 2007, President Correa issued a decree 
authorizing the creation of an Integral Auditing Commission for the Public Credit 
(CAIC) and charged it with determining the ―legitimacy, legality, transparency, 
quality, efficacy and efficiency‖ of the domestic and foreign public debt contracted 
between 1976 and 2006, taking into consideration ―the legal and financial aspects, 
and its economic and social impact on regions, the ecology and various nationalities 
and peoples.‖34 The CAIC was to analyze not just each bond issued at home and 
abroad, but also each and every loan contracted with official bilateral and multilateral 
agencies, as well as with commercial banks and suppliers, during the past three 
decades. It was to determine who had authorized the indebtedness in question, 
whether the requisite feasibility studies had been conducted, what conditions had 
been imposed, to what purpose the funds had been allocated in actual practice, and 
the comprehensive (―integral‖) impact of each project thus underwritten, among 
other matters.
35
 And it was to accomplish this mission within one year, although 
later on the CAIC was given an extra couple of months—until the end of September 
2008—to achieve what any reasonable observer would regard as a ―Mission 
Impossible.‖ The CAIC was not even allocated any funding to hire a staff until 
December 2007. Nevertheless, it managed to deliver a preliminary report in February 
2008, a second draft in July, and its final report in November 2008.
36
 
The CAIC’s designated members were four representatives of the Correa 
Administration, including the then finance minister plus six other Ecuadorians and 
three foreigners from social organizations who had worked on debt issues in Ecuador 
or elsewhere.
37
 However, none were professional auditors, and all had a long history 
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the translation is so poor that all quotes from the report are translations by this author from the 
Spanish original. 
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of militancy in the debt-forgiveness or debt-repudiation movement.
38
 The CAIC was 
chaired by Ricardo Patiño, an extreme leftist who in his early years had joined the 
Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua and had later held a post in the Sandinista 
government’s land-reform agency. Upon returning to Ecuador, Patiño set up the 
country’s Jubilee 2000 office, part of the international-coalition movement that 
called for the cancellation of third-world debt by the year 2000.
39
 He was appointed 
finance minister in January 2007, but a couple of weeks after being named to chair 
the CAIC, he stepped down from this cabinet post because of a scandal involving the 
alleged manipulation of Ecuador’s bonded debt. He was immediately given another 
cabinet post by Correa,
40
 and despite the appearance of impropriety and of a conflict 
of interest, Patiño was kept as the chairman of the CAIC.
41
  
The CAIC’s report was written in great haste, without the benefit of having hired 
professional auditors; interviewing public credit officers, finance ministers, or living 
presidents from 1976 through 2006; or obtaining access to many important 
documents.
42
 The report’s authors reveal that they requested information from 
eighteen government agencies, but never heard back from three of them, were given 
information that was not relevant by eleven of them, and obtained the documents 
they were seeking from just four agencies.
43
 In particular, the armed forces, known 
to have contracted many a foreign loan for the purchase of armaments (as confirmed 
by documents held by the finance ministry), had the audacity to issue a statement to 
the CAIC stating that they ―had not found any documentation that details any loans 
received from foreign commercial banks during the period 1976–2006.‖44 
As was to be expected given the circumstances, the CAIC report is incomplete, 
biased, and inaccurate. For example, the first misdeed it identifies involves none 
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other than the United States Federal Reserve, which is accused of ―illegally raising 
interest rates,‖ thereby causing Ecuador’s debt to snowball during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s.
45
 The accusation of illegality is ridiculous, of course. Moreover, a 
factual analysis based on official Ecuadorian statistics, which are publicly available, 
reveals that the temporary hike in U.S. interest rates under Federal Reserve Chairman 
Paul Volcker may explain, at best, a small fraction of the debt buildup that took place 
in those years. Ecuador’s public external indebtedness grew to $5 billion as of the 
end of 1982 from less than $2 billion at the end of 1978, but only about one-third of 
this increase could be justified by the need to borrow to cover the higher interest 
payments.
46
 Besides, while U.S. interest rates were being hiked, Ecuador was 
simultaneously benefiting from a doubling in its oil-export revenues, such that the 
government should have been able to afford the higher interest bill without recourse 
to extra borrowing.
47
 Indeed, despite a near halving of U.S. rates between the end of 
1982 and the end of 1987, the government’s external debt went on to double to $10 
billion. In sum, there is no basis for pinning Ecuador’s debt snowball on the Federal 
Reserve. 
The other accusations of ―illegality‖ made in the CAIC report target prior 
administrations, charging them with having violated either mostly unspecified 
Ecuadorian laws or ―basic principles of international law.‖48 Some examples of 
these transgressions are that prior administrations agreed to submit debt contracts to 
foreign jurisdiction (namely, New York and English law), to waive Ecuador’s 
sovereign immunity, and to accept conditions imposed by official multilateral 
agencies ―in violation of basic principles of international law such as the equality of 
sovereign states, the self-determination of peoples, the non-interference in the 
internal affairs of nations, the right to [economic] development, and the respect of 
human rights.‖49 There are also multiple accusations of ―irregularities,‖ like prior 
administrations’ prepaying debts (in the context of debt-refinancing agreements) 
when they were under no obligation to do so, and the government’s taking over 
private-sector obligations from 1983 through 1984 in the midst of a major economic 
crisis without auditing the beneficiaries to check whether their obligations were 
indeed still outstanding.
50
 
The CAIC report also censures loans obtained from foreign bilateral and 
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multilateral agencies on a variety of grounds. For example, funding from the World 
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) was used to purchase 
collateral to back the Brady bonds, ―thereby aiding and abetting the reallocation of 
funds for purposes other than those contemplated in the lending programs previously 
agreed.‖51 Prior administrations had also accepted various conditions imposed by 
official foreign creditors, had not prevented cost overruns in various projects funded 
by foreign loans, and had not carried out the necessary environmental and other 
impact studies.
52
 A number of specific projects are examined and sufficient 
objections raised about how they had been implemented to support the CAIC report’s 
recommendation of the repudiation of the multilateral loans involved.
53
 
Ominously, the CAIC report criticizes prior administrations for having 
―overpaid‖ greatly when they restructured their foreign obligations, particularly 
during the two bond exchanges in 1995 and 2000.
54
 With a perspective surely 
inspired by Argentina’s harsh treatment of its own bondholders, the report points out 
the costly ―mistakes‖ of recognizing and capitalizing interest arrears, and the failure 
to base their negotiation with creditors on prices for Ecuador’s defaulted debt as 
observed in the secondary market.
55
 Prior to the Brady bond exchange, the report 
noted, Ecuador owed $4.5 billion of principal plus $2.5 billion of past-due interest; 
but its obligations were trading in the secondary market at around twenty-five cents 
on the dollar, so that should have set the basis for the discount (seventy-five percent) 
applied during the debt-for-Brady-bonds exchange.
56
 Likewise, in 2000, the Brady 
bonds and Eurobonds were trading at around thirty cents on the dollar, so they should 
have been restructured on that basis (a seventy percent ―haircut‖), in which case only 
$1 billion of 2012 and 2030 bonds would have been issued instead of nearly $4 
billion.
57
  
 
IV 
THE DEFAULT AND ITS AFTERMATH 
 
The CAIC report was formally delivered to President Correa on November 20, 
2008, but by then, he was well aware of its contents—he had been handed a 
preliminary draft on October 23—and had already ordered that an upcoming $31 
million coupon payment on the 2012 bonds be skipped.
58
 A formal default on the 
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foreign debt was declared on December 12. Starting that day, Correa would justify 
the country’s moratorium on the basis that Ecuador’s debt obligations were 
―immoral,‖ ―illegal,‖ or ―illegitimate‖—preferably, all of the above. On December 
15, it was announced that an upcoming $30.5 million coupon payment on a ten-year 
sovereign bond that had been issued in December 2005 would likewise not be 
made.
59
 Yet as the weeks and months passed, it became apparent that Ecuador’s 
default would be highly selective rather than indiscriminate, and that it would lead 
neither to a repudiation of obligations as odious
60
 or on other grounds, nor to a 
negotiated or even unilateral debt exchange (Argentine style) for the purpose of 
obtaining massive debt forgiveness.
61
 
President Correa made clear on December 20 that all obligations to official 
bilateral and multilateral agencies would continue to be serviced in full and on time, 
notwithstanding the CAIC’s damning report and his own prior announcement that 
even debts deemed ―legitimate‖ would be subject to restructuring.62 He and his 
finance minister, María Elsa Viteri, explained before and after the New Year that the 
default would be confined to the ―commercial‖ debt, meaning Ecuador’s three 
sovereign bonds. In mid-January 2009, however, the government surprisingly 
decided to pay the coupon on the 2015 bond just before the grace period ran out, 
saying that its issuance was different from that of the other two—even though the 
CAIC report had condemned the 2015 bond right along with the others.
63
 By 
February, it became clear that the government was really targeting only the two 
bonds Correa had been despising for years, so it came as no surprise when the 
government failed to pay $135 million in interest due on the 2030 bonds. 
The way the Correa Administration dealt with these undesirable obligations was 
to buy them back from intimidated investors, indirectly at first and then directly, 
paying cash for a fraction of their face value (or rather, their pre-default market 
value), for the purpose of extinguishing them. The government reportedly began to 
purchase the 2012 bonds in the secondary market after their price collapsed 
following the mid-November 2008 decision to default on them, using an Ecuadorian 
bank as the front man.
64
 It then continued repurchasing its securities after defaulting 
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on the 2030 bond, such that by one estimate, the government picked up as much as 
half of the two bond issues in this manner.
65
 On April 20, 2009, the government 
announced a buyback offer to repurchase the 2012 and 2030 bonds through a 
modified Dutch auction with a base price of thirty cents on the dollar.
66
 A disclosure 
document was circulated by the deal’s manager, Lazard Frères, with an expiration 
date of May 15 for all offers. The document made plain that Ecuador had ―no 
intention of resuming payments on these bonds following the [e]xpiration [d]ate.‖67 
Despite an attempt to organize resistance among bondholders, ninety-one percent of 
the bonds outstanding were tendered—presumably including those in government 
hands—and were bought back at a discount of between sixty-five and seventy 
percent, thereby retiring nearly $3 billion in bonds for around $900 million in cash 
payments. Holdouts were then offered another chance to tender at thirty-five cents on 
the dollar, and in November 2009, an offer aimed at Italian investors was launched 
on identical terms. As a result, by the end of 2009, the government had successfully 
bought back about ninety-five percent of the 2012 and 2030 bonds.
68
 
Obviously, this manner of dealing with a sovereign’s debt burden hinges on 
having more ample cash resources on hand than necessary to meet the interest 
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payments falling due. It is neither an affordable strategy for a sovereign that is 
experiencing an acute liquidity crisis nor a smart strategy for a solvent sovereign able 
to refinance its obligations at lower interest rates—the far more common situations 
encountered in the practice of sovereign international finance. It also presupposes 
attaching little cost to damaging the issuer’s (already tattered) reputation as a debtor, 
as well as having no intention of regaining access to the international bond 
markets—at least not for many years. The government of Ecuador had been able to 
tap the international bond markets on one occasion (in December 2005), six years 
after its prior default, when the 2015 bond was issued. However, the Correa 
Administration soon made it known that it did not intend to return to the international 
private-capital markets. Its plan has been to rely on external financing from 
governments such as China, Iran, and Russia and from official multilateral 
agencies—preferably other than the IMF and the World Bank, regarded with 
long-standing animosity by President Correa.
69
 
Evidently, the authorities did not care that their default would cause collateral 
damage, triggering capital flight and impairing the ability of Ecuadorian banks and 
corporations to access financing from foreign commercial creditors at a time of 
global financial turmoil. According to central-bank data, the private sector in 
Ecuador was able to borrow much less from abroad after the default than it had 
borrowed before, such that because repayments exceeded disbursements, the stock of 
its external-debt obligations dropped by over fifteen percent between September 
2008 and December 2009.
70
 Surveys of foreign banks’ exposure to banks and 
corporations in Ecuador reveal an absolute drop of twelve percent in the year after 
September 2008 versus a fall of six percent to these obligors throughout Latin 
America during the same period.
71
 
The deplorable fact is that no leading government or any official multilateral 
agency based in Washington or Latin America went on record to express any dismay 
at Ecuador’s latest default and alleged bond-market manipulation. On the contrary, 
the local representatives of the regional development banks uttered words of moral 
support, and their headquarters provided an indirect blessing to the default and debt 
buyback by ramping up their lending to the government—despite an obvious 
deterioration in Ecuador’s creditworthiness and macroeconomic fundamentals in 
2009. The Inter-American Development Bank’s representative in Ecuador, Carlos 
Melo, stated that ―[t]he good results obtained [in the restructuring] will benefit all 
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Ecuadorians during difficult times. . . . The IADB reiterates its predisposition to work 
alongside Ecuadorians to promote economic development.‖ 72  Sure enough, the 
IADB stepped up its approval of new loans to Ecuador, agreeing to $515 million in 
new loans in 2009 versus a mere $50 million in 2008.
73
 
The Colombia-based Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR), for its part, made a 
general-purpose $480-million loan to Ecuador in July 2009; it had not lent anything 
to the government in the three prior years.
74
 And the Venezuela-headquartered 
Andean Development Corporation (CAF) approved $873 million in loans to the 
Correa Administration in 2009, an increase from $604 million in 2008.
75
 The CAF’s 
representative in Ecuador, Luis Palau-Rivas, said in May 2009 that the regional 
lender saw the defaulted-debt restructuring ―positively because it’s a voluntary 
process [that is] helping to solve a difficult situation . . . and will benefit everyone.‖76 
The idea that Ecuador’s bondholders were participants in ―a voluntary process‖ is 
ludicrous, of course. As one veteran financial reporter rightly commented at the time, 
since the bondholders had no say whatsoever in the unilateral destruction of the value 
of their investments, their only ―choice‖ was whether to accept Ecuador’s risible 
offer or to hold onto defaulted Ecuadorian paper indefinitely.
77
 Beyond the 
supportive signals they sent to the government of Ecuador throughout the default, the 
multilateral agencies ended up disbursing nearly $860 million to the country in 2009, 
152% more than the $340 million they had disbursed in 2008.
78
 
The Correa Administration requested no loans or other support from the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank in 2008 or 2009, and probably did not 
consult with them, either. But when a reporter asked the IMF about its attitude 
towards Ecuador’s default, the institution’s spokeswoman lamely said, 
It is longstanding [IMF] policy to encourage our members to, wherever possible, be current in 
servicing debt obligations, and when they are economically unsustainable to enter into productive 
negotiations [with their creditors]. We understand that Ecuador’s decision to default on these 
bonds is based on a dispute about [their] legal validity rather than [on] debt sustainability 
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[grounds], and of course we don’t take sides on the merits.‖79 
 
All things considered, the official community’s tacit approval of Ecuador’s 
default is deeply troubling.
80
 In practice, only governments and multilateral 
organizations, rather than any group of private-sector bondholders, banks, or 
suppliers, could have reined in a wayward sovereign debtor such as Ecuador in 
2009—or Argentina from 2002 through the present, for that matter. As became 
evident in the 1980s, 1990s, and again during the recent global financial crisis, only 
the official community can exercise the kind of collective diplomatic pressure and 
put forth the financial incentives and disincentives necessary to motivate sovereigns 
to comply with their financial obligations—or at least to treat private creditors in a 
relatively responsible manner. This much was obvious even before bondholders 
obtained their many pyrrhic victories in New York and European courts in the wake 
of Argentina’s gigantic default. Legal precedents and plenty of indenture innovations 
notwithstanding, even the best of contract intentions cannot prevent investors from 
going through a hellish experience at the hands of a sovereign debtor unwilling to 
honor the spirit and the letter of its legal commitments. 
Interestingly, just as Ecuador’s selective default and buyback attracted no 
opprobrium in official or multilateral circles, it did not gather any plaudits from the 
debt-cancellation movement either. From 2007 through 2008, virtually all national, 
regional, and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), agitating for 
massive forgiveness of developing-country debt, hailed Ecuador’s decision to 
conduct a thorough ―independent‖ audit of its external indebtedness. Dozens of such 
organizations sent an open letter to President Correa in 2008 expressing their support 
for the audit, and favorable declarations along the same lines were made by legal 
experts meeting in Quito that July as well as by participants in a symposium on 
illegitimate debt that gathered in Oslo in October 2008, among others.
81
 To our 
knowledge, though, not one of these organizations has expressed its approval of how 
Ecuador went about dealing with the results and recommendations of the CAIC 
audit. In fact, a November 2009 meeting of nearly thirty organizations—in Ecuador, 
of all places—made no mention in its Guayaquil Declaration of how the host country 
had dealt with its ―immoral,‖ ―illegal,‖ and ―illegitimate‖ debt obligations.82  
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This deafening silence on the part of the advocates for across-the-board debt 
cancellation is understandable. The case of Ecuador does not fit the odious-debt 
doctrine or related grounds for repudiation. To begin with, the country has been 
under continuous civilian, constitutional rule since mid-1979. Though it has been 
mismanaged, it was not plundered by an egomaniacal dictator. The greatest build-up 
in foreign public indebtedness took place from 1980 through 1994, when the sum 
total of obligations (including arrears) skyrocketed from less than $3 billion to nearly 
$14 billion, tripling even in relation to rising government revenues and GDP.
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During this extended period, duly elected civilians were in charge, none of whom has 
been found guilty of any illegal conduct. Issues of state succession, war-related 
debts, widespread corruption, the absence of informed consent, or collusion on the 
part of creditors to divert funds for contrary purposes—none of these criteria seem 
applicable here. Nor are the charges of illegitimacy made by the CAIC and President 
Correa those usually offered as strong arguments for debt cancellation, such as 
obligations that involve predatory terms, that cannot be serviced without violating 
basic human rights, or that go against widely accepted legal, financial, or ethical 
standards. 
What is a supporter of debt cancellation to make of the very arbitrary manner in 
which the Correa Administration proceeded—accepting responsibility for every loan 
made to Ecuador by every official (bilateral and multilateral) foreign lender, even 
though the CAIC documented plenty of irregularities involving many of them? And 
what about the decision to default selectively on two bonds, but not on a third one 
that the CAIC had tarred and feathered just the same? How could someone from that 
camp express approval for a government that spent its ―hard-earned money‖ buying 
back supposedly immoral, illegal, and illegitimate obligations, thereby validating 
them?  
 
V 
CONCLUSION 
 
The story of Ecuador’s repudiation of its debt in this unprincipled way is the 
cautionary tale of the bad things that can happen to good sovereign debt contracts. It 
is one that even experienced international lawyers, bankers, analysts, and investors 
would be well advised to heed. 
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